Careers and Bureaucratic Loyalty in Dictatorships
Why do some officials loyally serve repressive regimes, whereas others do not?
How do regimes step up loyalty within the state apparatus?
Under what conditions does loyalty corrode?
And what is the role of individuals’ ambitions and career prospects in all this?
These are the questions addressed in my book project with Christian Gläßel. We scrutinize the inner workings of the state’s security apparatus.
The core argument of the book is that hierarchical, pyramid-shaped organizations generate mundane career pressures that motivate concerned individuals to undertake unorthodox career decisions. Officials may force their way up the hierarchy by participating in a coup, or they demonstrate their value by conducting the regime's dirty work. An integral part of the project is the collection of original, biographical data on security officials in Argentina and Nazi Germany.
How do regimes step up loyalty within the state apparatus?
Under what conditions does loyalty corrode?
And what is the role of individuals’ ambitions and career prospects in all this?
These are the questions addressed in my book project with Christian Gläßel. We scrutinize the inner workings of the state’s security apparatus.
The core argument of the book is that hierarchical, pyramid-shaped organizations generate mundane career pressures that motivate concerned individuals to undertake unorthodox career decisions. Officials may force their way up the hierarchy by participating in a coup, or they demonstrate their value by conducting the regime's dirty work. An integral part of the project is the collection of original, biographical data on security officials in Argentina and Nazi Germany.
Figure 1. Pyramidal organizations and career choices.